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does not want Pyongyang to collapse, politically or economically; at the same
time, Beijing is pessimistic about the reunification of North and South Korea.
Similarly, emerging nationalism in China
and in Japan, and military modernisation
in both nations, strengthen their threat
perceptions. A confrontation between
these two regional powers is possible, but
a military one would appear to be highly
unlikely in the near future. In short, regional stability and security hang on the
joint efforts of all regional powers.
The book has two major flaws concerning PLA capabilities. First, the authors of
these essays rely exclusively on their distinct assessments of PLA material power
and terms of reference, and these leave
unrecognized the role of Chinese spiritual power—that is, political indoctrination and nationalism—and of the incalculable advantages to the Chinese of fighting a war, whether high-tech or low-tech,
on their homeland. Second, naval readers
will regret the lack of an in-depth study
of the Chinese navy. Also, there is no
mention of recent developments in divesting the PLA of commercial enterprises, implementing the regulations of
joint operations, or in introducing a joint
support system.
All in all, the book is not only highly recommended for students of PLA studies
but will undoubtedly also interest readers
who have a general concern for Chinese
and East Asian security.
JIANXIANG BI

Kanata, Ontario, Canada

Kim, Duk-ki. Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia:
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The growing economic, strategic, and
cultural importance of Asia calls for a
U.S. foreign policy attuned to the
unique environment of this diverse area.
As this economic dreadnought emerges
from the fog of uneven treaties, wars,
and cultural misunderstanding, U.S.
politico-military thinkers must recognize the pressures of history and geography that will dislodge any policy not
firmly anchored in Asian realities.
Northeast Asia in particular, with its increasing importance in world trade, its
potential for undersea resource development, archipelagic territorial disputes, and
the possibility of environmental catastrophe caused by its rapid industrialization
and nuclear-waste dumping at sea, is vital
to U.S. geostrategic interests. These factors, coupled with historical regional animosities, a diminishing Russian and U.S.
military presence, a naval arms buildup,
and the associated ability to project power
from the sea, highlight that security in
Northeast Asia has assumed a decidedly
maritime flavor.
Competing interests and local concerns
abound. China desires to be a world
power and regional leader, if not a
full-fledged Asian hegemon. Japan quietly remilitarizes as it accepts a larger regional security role. South Korea desires
unification of the peninsula under democratic rule, eagerly awaiting the collapse
of the intransigent and Stalinist regime.
Finally, the United States and Russia have
growing regional economic and political
interests, accompanied by a waning military presence brought on by budget constraints and defense retrenchments. Thus
Northeast Asia, a bubbling cauldron that
may boil over at any moment, is a focus of
world attention.
This book is largely based on research
for the author’s doctoral dissertation.
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Commander Duk-ki Kim, Republic of
Korea Navy, has developed a wonderful
primer for anyone desiring to understand
the underlying factors of Northeast Asian
international relations and emerging
maritime issues. Kim’s purpose for writing this book was to design a cooperative
maritime security structure to enhance
security throughout Northeast Asia.
In this scrupulously footnoted and documented work, Kim calls for bilateral and
multilateral cooperative security among
historically adversarial Northeast Asian
nations. This framework for security will
not only strengthen understanding of
mutual security needs but also broaden
the definition of security beyond the traditional approach of unilateral defense.
Kim defines cooperative security as a system of security practiced with, rather
than against, adversaries. His suggested
maritime measures for security forums
include: naval arms control to provide
limitations and constraint; maritime
confidence building measures to provide
reassurance, confidence, and transparency;
and maritime cooperation to introduce habits of cooperation.
Kim argues that the opportunity exists
now for the regional powers to turn to
cooperative security measures in order to
lend stability to this historically unstable
area. This cooperation, he believes, will
go far in allaying fears of China’s growing
power-projection capability and Japan’s
acceptance of its growing regional security role. Cooperative security measures
will also help in resolving resource and
fisheries claims that threaten to erupt into
open hostilities. By providing a vehicle for
dialogue, cooperative security may serve
as an acceptable alternative in the
absence of any other formal institutional
structure to manage growing disputes.
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Kim’s first three chapters make an excellent summary of the overarching maritime political and strategic concerns that
undergird naval strategy in the region.
Kim follows with chapters that describe
U.S., Russian, and Japanese maritime
strategies and concerns, and he concludes
by showing how trying to amalgamate
these diverse interests can be greatly
eased by U.S. and Northeast Asian cooperative approaches on bilateral, regional,
and international levels to provide stability through a framework of dialogue on
peace and security.
As a naval officer intimately familiar
with the region, Kim assesses the limitations of his proposals, such as Northeast
Asian nations that are not yet ready for
full-scale negotiations on reductions in
naval forces. As these navies continue to
grow, he sees a need for agreements to
mitigate the inevitable high-seas misunderstandings. He also calls for more
transparency through increased ship visits and high-level official exchanges, as
well as cooperative development of offshore natural resources. As a further preventive measure, Kim suggests rules
governing fishery violations, to help
avoid dustups over fishing rights.
Although an excellent background read,
this book contains two flaws that, while
they do not detract from the central
theme or lessen its value as a resource,
may disconcert the reader. First, although much of Kim’s work was completed before 1999, the copyright date is
2000. Thus in a number of places Kim refers to actions that should occur “by the
next century,” or “by the year 2000.” Additionally, because of the dynamism of
naval growth within Northeast Asia,
much of the force structure he projects
for the future already exists (e.g., the
Luhai-class DDG alluded to on page 146
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joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in
January 1999, and a Sovremenny DDG
entered the Chinese order of battle in
early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat
the Republic of Korea Navy as a major
regional actor, leaving it conspicuously
absent from his chapters on strategy and
concerns about cooperative maritime
security. This is a significant omission.
Korea is a growing naval power with
extensive regional concerns, and it is possibly the nation most likely to find itself
in armed conflict across its borders.
These gaps aside, this is a book worth
having in a library on modern Asia. The
extensive selected bibliography adds
value to this work as a resource on
Northeast Asian politico-military matters. It obviously should be required
reading for those involved in Northeast
Asian regional maritime issues, and it
would also be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the unique problems
of Northeast Asia and possible solutions
to them.
ROBERT MARABITO

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and
the Undoing of an American Hero. New York: Free
Press, 2000. 385pp. $27.50

No figure of the Korean War looms quite
so large as General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, arrogant, inscrutable, successful, and
fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy.
His military career, spanning the major
portion of the twentieth century, also renders him appealing as a symbol of broader
themes of that war and of American society. So we come to Stanley Weintraub’s
MacArthur’s War, advertised on its dust
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jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered
history of the general who refuses to fade
away,” a book based on “extensive research in primary and secondary sources
and laced with colorful anecdotes.”
Unfortunately, the book is none of those
things but rather a facile, cobbled-together
mishmash of principally secondary
sources, laced with myriad errors of chronology, fact, and interpretation—all
poorly documented. When reading this
book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral
James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a
Korean War history sent to him in the late
1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon assault and Hungnam redeployment contain
so many errors and distortions of fact and
of emphasis that I am unable to assist you
with my comment.” However, I would
like to make note of a baker’s dozen of
errors to provide specific evidence for my
general assertions.
The author states on page 107 that the
amphibious commander, Rear Admiral
Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly
Turner’s operations officer in the final
months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle
served on Turner’s staff from August
1942 to March 1943; in the final months
of the war, Doyle was commanding the
cruiser Pasadena. These are not obscure
facts but can readily be found both in
George Dyer’s biography of Turner, The
Amphibians Came to Conquer, and in
Doyle’s official biography at the Naval
Historical Center.
Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral
Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur
the need to sail early for Inchon because
of the typhoon season. “Although nearly
a month remained before departure, the
ship movement orders were issued immediately,” which would suggest that
the conversation took place around 15
August. Burke was good, but probably
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